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CAN GOOD SAMARITAN LAWS FIT INTO THE
UNITED STATES LEGAL/POLITICAL
FRAMEWORK?: A BRIEF RESPONSE TO
ELSPETH FARMER, JOSHUA DRESSLER, AND
MARC FRANKLIN
Margalynne Armstrong*
Do Good Samaritan statutes fit into the American legal
system? Professors Dressler and Franklin have argued that a
duty to rescue-enforced by either criminal sanctions or civil
liability-would not fit easily into United States law. They
question whether it is possible to reconcile Good Samaritan
liability with United States legal and political traditions.
This response argues that narrowly and carefully crafted
criminal statutes could fit into American law pursuant to
traditions of civic republicanism and civil reciprocity.
There is certainly statutory precedent for duty to rescue
laws. Professors Dressler and Franklin described the
mandatory "safe rescue" statutes of Vermont, Minnesota, and
Rhode Island,' arguing against their extension. Elspeth
Farmer has described the history and content of Germany's
criminal proscriptions for failure to lend assistance to a
stranger in danger.2 Such a failure to assist can result in
punishment of up to one-year imprisonment, if several key
conditions exist.3 Despite the existence of this established
* Associate Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. J.D.,
University of California, Berkley; B.A., Earlham College.
1. See Joshua Dressier, Some Thoughts (Mostly Negative) About "Bad
Samaritan" Laws, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 971, 977; Marc A. Franklin &
Matthew Ploeger, Of Rescue and Report: Should Tort Law Impose a Duty to
Help Endangered Persons or Abused Children?, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 991,
1002 n.44.
2. See Elspeth Farmer, Address at the Santa Clara Law Review
Symposium: Law, Ethics, and the Good Samaritan: Should There Be a Duty to
Rescue? (Mar. 24, 2000) (on file with Professor Kathleen Ridolfi, Santa Clara
University School of Law).
3. The obligation to render assistance arises if help is clearly necessary,
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German model, Ms. Farmer concludes that Germany's legal
and political expectations center around the obligations of
citizens and government to each other, rather than focusing
on the protection of individual rights from government
interference as is the case in the United States. Ms. Farmer
finds the German and American legal cultures to be
sufficiently different from each other as to preclude successful
duty to rescue laws from arising stateside.
Ms. Farmer is quite validly concerned about the ability of
legal transplants to take root in societies that are dissimilar
to that in which those rules were originally created. But
despite the differences between an American society more
focused on individualism than communitarianism, an
American duty to rescue law would not be doomed to rejection
because there are areas of American political history and
tradition that would accommodate a duty to rescue. If we
look at the duty to rescue, not so much as a duty that involves
an obligation to another individual, but as an obligation to
society, we find where these laws could fit into United States
law. A duty to rescue as civic obligation has roots in our
American tradition, particularly the Jeffersonian tradition of
civic republicanism.4 A duty to rescue might be construed as
a form of civic reciprocity, something we owe to other
members of our society as needed because we would want to
receive the same from others were our positions reversed.
We already have a major instance of civic reciprocity in
the American legal tradition of jury duty. Why is it that we
punish people with potential criminal sanctions if they fail to
show up for jury duty? Well, the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution promises the right to trial by jury. Only by
could be reasonably expected under the circumstances, and could be rendered
without increased personal danger to the rescuer. See Dressler, supra note 1, at
982-83.
4. "[A] civic republican reading of American citizenship emphasizes not
individual rights but participation in the forms of democratic self-governance
and public service the nation provides. In this view involvement in American
public life is not just the occasional price of preserving individual liberties, but
is our prime civic duty, part of a shared commitment to help shape our lives in
common and serve our common interests." Rogers M. Smith, American
Conceptions of Citizenship and National Service, 3 THE RESPONSIVE
COMMUNITY 14, 15 (1993). Rodgers goes on to note that Americans generally
downplay this conception of citizenship. See also Stanley N. Katz, Thomas
Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary America, 19 J.L. & ECON.
467 (1976).
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calling upon citizens to protect each other's individual rights
can that Fifth Amendment right be protected. A person
accused of crime would presumably want to exercise his or
her constitutional right to a jury trial. So as the reciprocal to
that right, we are required to serve on a jury when selected.
In order to have a system in which we are judged by people
(rather than authorities) from our communities, we also have
a duty to make that same resource available to other citizens
in the position of being on trial.
Participation in community is an important aspect of
civic reciprocity. Community is also central to the theme of
this Symposium and I wanted to mention that Professor
Dressler raised an interesting point in his statement that we
probably would not be here at all had it not been for David
Cash's remarks. Specifically, Cash's statements about how
he observed the relationship between himself and Strohmeyer
as opposed to the relationship, or lack of relationship, he
observed between himself and Sherrice Iverson. I think this
is true in terms of the idea that we would not be here, but the
public reaction to what Cash has said is something that I
think allows us to understand why the law could impose some
kind of narrowly defined criminal obligation, or criminal duty
to intervene, in these kinds of situations.
One of the real horrors of what Cash said was how it
objectified Sherrice Iverson, and made her a part of the
"other," someone who was not defined as a part of his
community. So Cash could find that he had an obligation to
his friend Strohmeyer, his obligation was not to intervene.
But Sherrice was someone who Cash saw as akin to people in
another country, "Egypt," or "Panama," someone to whom he
had no relation. And this construction of Sherrice as being
somebody completely outside the frame of community
connection with David Cash, I think, was a concern to people.
It shocked and horrified people. People rightfully saw that
construction of Sherrice as the "other" as a danger to society.
And when the public or their officials recognize behavior that
is dangerous to society, we often impose criminal liability or
restrict the ability of people to engage in that kind of
behavior.
So what is the danger to society, what is it that we expect
of each other in a society such as ours? Going back to the
idea of civic republicanism, there is an advantage to having a
10292000]
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citizenry of people who have an investment in society. These
people who have this kind of investment in society make the
best citizens. To underscore this point, Jefferson advocated
land ownership in small amounts for a wide number of people
to make them feel invested in the larger society. That idea of
getting people invested in society can be applied to this
situation-in that society consists of people, neighbors, and
citizens who are in the same geographic framework as you
are. Thus, if you are invested in these people, invested in
each other, you are invested in society and will make a better
citizen. And so the idea of civic republicanism has at its core
that all of society will participate and have a stake in
reaching the best kind of decisions, rather than just self-
interested decision making that benefits individuals.
Thus, I think that there are precedents in the United
States that can help us to see a place for a responsibility to
rescue under the criminal law. Any criminal duty to assist
would have to be fairly narrowly defined, and very carefully
crafted to avoid the kind of problems that Professor Dressler
mentioned, particularly in the Jack and Jill hypothetical.
The Jack and Jill hypothetical found a duty to actually do or
perform some kind of action to save Jill which might have
resulted in an injury to Jack. But if you carefully craft a
statute that imposes a duty to rescue, or a duty to intervene
in some way, then you should avoid some of the scope
problems that Professor Dressler was concerned about.
A carefully enough crafted statute would say that one
could not hurt another in the attempt to rescue. You are not
obliged to hurt Jack in order to save Jill. You have not
violated your duty if the only way to save Jill is to injure
Jack. And so not only are we protecting the individual
rescuer from liability for injuries that happen, but we are also
protecting people who are facing the situation so that there is
not a choice imposed upon the rescuer to prefer one person
over the other.
This too is a really basic premise of American
jurisprudence. That is, if the law is requiring us to do
something with respect to helping another person, we are not
supposed to favor-and the law does not favor-one person
over another. You see this kind of analysis in the abortion
cases where the law does not say you have to go ahead with a
late term pregnancy if the mother's life is in danger. Society
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is generally not going to prefer one specific life over another.
So I do think that there is a way to fit the duty to rescue into
our tradition that addresses the concerns we have that
somehow someone can walk through a situation like that in
the casino and not do anything. It is not just that Cash failed
to act, but the idea that failure to do something really hurt
the larger society, not just Sherrice Iverson.
Finally, I agree with Professor Franklin that tort liability
is not really a concern here. In framing the obligation to
rescue in criminal terms, it is an obligation that is really
owed to society, as opposed to just the individual. Our civil
court system looks at compensation, the redress of claims by
an individual, as opposed to redressing society. Thus, we can
let the criminal law take care of this and not have any type of
individual compensatory liability on the part of someone who
fails to rescue.
Such an approach helps us fit this whole analysis into the
story of the Good Samaritan, but in a kind of secular way.
The point of the story of the Good Samaritan is to answer the
question, "who is your neighbor?" Who can be a neighbor?
And the story informs us that we each have the capacity to
act as a neighbor to whomever we encounter. In the religious
tradition, this is what God demands of people who wish to be
judged as righteous. If we secularize this idea and require
treating whomever we encounter as a neighbor, as one of our
obligations as a member of this society, then we are really in
touch with the idea of the story of the Good Samaritan. It is
not just that we have a duty to rescue, but that we have the
ability to find a connection between ourselves and strangers
who face peril. David Cash's inability to make that
connection was fatal to Sherrice Iverson, and harmful to all of
us. As citizens, we each have the capacity to treat whomever
we encounter as a constituent member of our society. This is
what we should demand of each other in the name of civic
responsibility.
103120001
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